Truth, reason and nation building (4)

But Ojukwu, overwhelmed by personal ambition and popular support, decided that “an early practicable date” meant “four days later,” without detailed preparation for the worst case scenario – war. In the early hours of May 30 1967, he declared the transformation of Eastern region into The Republic of Biafra. Looking at the issue dispassionately, although Ojukwu was under tremendous pressure to pull Eastern region out of Nigeria, he lacked the necessary political experience and sagacity to neutralise the understandable anger of his people and explore less extreme or disruptive approach for resolving the conflict between Eastern region and the federal government. Now, a lot has been written on the civil war, which actually began on July 6 1967 when a contingent of the Nigerian army unleashed an artillery barrage on Ogoja on the northernmost border of Biafra. Sometime ago, I discussed some of the issues concerning the war when some Yoruba ethnic irredentists attacked Chinua Achebe for labelling Awolowo’s advocacy of starvation-as-a-legitimate-weapon-of-war strategy an act of genocide. The basic points we need to reiterate now are these. First, based on the extraordinarily difficult situation of Easterners before actual hostilities began, Gowon’s provocative lack of sincerity in implementing the Aburi Accord and burning desire for freedom from Northern belligerence were very compelling for majority of Easterners, especially Ndigbo. But that does not mean that the war was inevitable: major decision makers on both sides could have chosen to make more far-reaching concessions if they had considered carefully the fact that every war, irrespective of its origin and justification, entails suffering, death and destruction without necessarily guaranteeing satisfactory solution to the problem that led to it in the first place. Second, Gowon and Ojukwu were blinded by strong petty egoistic impulses that prevented them from making compromises to avert armed confrontation. Pathological self-serving obsession of Gowon, some of his top sycophantic advisers such as Alison Ayida and Anthony Enahoro, and key leaders of the Northern establishment for “One Nigeria” made them harden their hearts against Biafrans. As a corollary, serious underestimation of the depth of resentment in the East towards federal government’s sloppy handling of the pogroms and Gowon’s overconfident belief that “a short, surgical police action” would crush the secessionists made him rashly declare war on Biafra. Third, Ojukwu, from all accounts, was an ambitious young man whose knowledge of modern history fed into his idealistic dream of leading a sovereign nation with potentials to become the greatest black nation in the world. With that kind of mindset, it was virtually impossible for the Biafran leader to listen to unpopular but wise counsel, which might dissuade him from secession. The East, particularly Igboland, was horribly devastated by the war. Nothing epitomises the egregious loss suffered by Biafrans more than Ojukwu’s comment, in an interview with Karl Maier, that the war was “a monumental waste.” It must be noted in passing that despite his shortcomings, in choosing the life of public service instead of living a private life of opulence made possible by his father’s incredible wealth, Ojukwu manifested a high degree of selflessness that is hard to find among Nigerian leaders since the war ended in 1970. In terms of socio-economic development and political status, the civil war pushed Eastern Nigeria backwards at least two decades. After the war, Ndigbo lost the preeminent position they occupied in various aspects of our national life before the war. Gowon declared “No Victor, no Vanquished,” meaning that it was time to forget old animosities and rebuild Nigeria. However, it turned out that the declaration was a shibboleth: his administration began a systematic political and economic marginalisation of Igboland. It is ironic that Gowon now presents himself as a patriot who did his best to preserve national unity. His “Nigeria Prays” is a programme set up ostensibly to seek peaceful solutions, including divine intervention, to the myriads of problems facing the country. On the surface, “Nigeria Prays” is a laudable project. Yet, when one remembers some of the inhuman tactics he used against Biafra, most especially his choice of starvation as a weapon of war, economic strangulation and lack of commitment to the reconstruction of battered Eastern region, the hollowness of Gowon’s efforts at restitution and reconciliation leaps into bold relief. Clearly, the civil war was very stressful for everyone. All the same, if Gowon was keen about reconstruction of the East, why did his government fail to provide adequate funds for it? Why did he approve the crippling economic measures taken against the Igbo after the war? Was he sincere in dealing with the abandoned property problem? The immediate post war years ushered in a period of existential retardation for Igbo people in general. Aside from having little resources to overcome the devastation caused by military bombardment and starvation, Ndigbo, as we noted earlier, were marginalised; they were excluded from topmost positions in the military, police, and strategic appointments in the federal civil service. Additionally, from 1970 to 1999, Northern heads of state religiously implemented a deliberate policy of denying Igboland federal investments in infrastructure, heavy industries and other developmental projects. Thus, although Olusegun Obasanjo’s military administration did not improve federal presence in Igboland significantly, there is no doubt in my mind that Gowon and others really intended to punish the Igbo for daring to challenge internal colonisation. Northern military dictators were so obsessed with revenge that in state creation and delineation of local government areas which partly determine the quantum of federal revenue that accrues to each geopolitical zone, they manipulated the system so that South East would have the least. This is not to exculpate prominent Igbo leaders from the shoddy treatment of Igbo people by Northern heads of state. In fact, exaggerated survivalist instincts after the civil war made a critical mass of Ndigbo, particularly members of the political and business elite, to abandon time-tested Igbo ideology of ezigbo aha ka ego (good name is more precious than riches) and embrace unbridled quest for wealth. There is widespread belief that a typical Igbo political leader or businessperson would willingly compromise the collective interest of his people as long as he is compensated financially or with lucrative government appointment and contracts. Now, although this attitude is not restricted to Ndigbo alone, its domination of the mindset of certain prominent sons and daughters of Igboland has had more serious negative repercussions in Southeastern Nigeria than similar situation in other parts of the country. This is because Igboland suffered most from the war, necessitating extraordinarily efforts from her leaders to rebuild the place. Unfortunately, with the exception of Alex Ekwueme, Sam Mbakwe, Chris Ngige, and a handful of selfless Igbo politicians, key players in the political arena seem completely unconcerned with the plight of Igboland. Corruption has been a leitmotiv in Nigeria since independence. Yet, it must be stated that, given the devastating effects of the civil war and deliberate marginalisation of Igboland by successive administrations at the centre, Igbo political leaders should have avoided it the way people avoid Ebola virus, and utilised every kobo accruing to their states for developmental projects and human capital development. After all, onye ulo ya na agba oku anaghi achu oke (a person whose house is burning does not pursue rats). To be continued. - See more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/08/truth-reason-nation-building-4/#sthash.O9pS5iyf.dpuf